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Determinants of Access to Credit and Loan Amount:  
Household-level Evidence from Urban Ethiopia 
Abi Kedir 
 
Abstract  
 
Household level analysis of credit rationing is restricted to rural data sets collected 
mainly from South East Asia. In Africa, credit constraints are often investigated using 
firm level data. Empirical evidence on determinants of credit constraints and amount 
borrowed by urban households is almost non-existent from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Using an extended direct approach, we analyzed the Fourth Round Ethiopian Urban 
Household Survey (2000) to separate households that do not have access to credit 
from those who do. We find a high percentage (i.e. 26.6%) of credit-constrained 
households, the majority of which constitute discouraged borrowers. A probit model 
and a tobit procedure that allows potential selectivity bias identified factors affecting 
households’ likelihood of being credit constrained and the volume of loan amount 
respectively. Our analysis found geographical location of households, current 
household resources, schooling of the household head, value of assets, collateral,  
number of dependants, marital status and outstanding debt as significant factors. 
Finally, we consider the policy implications of our results.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the following two important questions; 1) 
what are the factors that determine households’ likelihood of being credit constrained 
in urban areas of Ethiopia? and 2) what are the determinants of the volume of 
household debt? We answer both questions by analyzing an urban household survey 
data collected from seven urban centers in Ethiopia in 2000. The study follows a 
direct approach to identify credit-constrained households. We extend the definition of 
credit constrained households adopted by Jappelli (1990) by taking into account 
households who have applied for loan but who got a loan amount which is less than 
the amount they have applied for. After establishing the extent of rationing in the 
formal sector, we examine the characteristics of the households who are likely to be 
constrained. In an econometric framework, we identify factors that affect the 
probability of being credit constrained and the volume of loan amount demanded by 
households. The results of our paper contribute to the existing little survey-based 
quantitative evidence on households’ access to credit in Africa particularly from 
urban areas. Identifying the characteristics of credit-constrained households can be a 
useful guide to policy makers as to where targeting is needed to remove constraints 
and enhance the risk-pooling/productive capacity of households.  
 
In this study, we found a high percentage (i.e. 26.6%) of credit-constrained 
households after accounting for ‘size rationing’ in which households borrow less than 
they desired. We have not found support for the rationing hypothesis which assumes 
that formal credit is the cheapest credit available (Pal, 2002; Bell et al 1997). Our 
econometric analysis revealed that households’ probability of being credit constrained 
and the volume of loan amount are significantly affected by current household 
resources, collateral, schooling of the household head, number of dependants, 
location, marital status and outstanding debt.  
 
Despite important recent advances in providing financial services to the poor through 
microfinance initiatives, there are still many opportunities to improve practice when 
we look at household survey evidence on credit access. We maintain that a better 
understanding of the workings of financial institutions (both formal and informal) and 
determinants of households’ access to credit is an integral part of poverty reduction 
efforts in poor countries (Amin et al 2003). Such an understanding has been hampered 
by the absence of household-level data that enables one to identify the factors 
associated with credit-constraint. There is also yet little firm evidence, particularly, 
from urban areas of Africa about the characteristics of the households who are likely 
to be constrained and the extent of credit rationing in the formal sector (Diagne, 
1999). In Africa, credit constraints are investigated using firm level data mainly due 
to lack of data from household surveys (Bigsten et al 2003; Fafchamps, 2000). Most 
household level studies focus on rural credit markets in India (Pal, 2002; Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2001; Kochar, 1997; Bell et al, 1997).  The existing literature particularly on 
credit constraints and the demand for loan amount focuses on developed countries 
(Crook, 2001 and Jappelli, 1990).  
 
The life-cycle permanent income hypothesis (LCPIH) of consumption assumes the 
presence of perfect capital markets and abstracts from certainty. This postulate has 
been attacked by substantial empirical evidence using mainly data sets from 
developed countries (Zeldes, 1989; Jappelli, 1990).  Except for Jappelli (1990), these 
studies have shown the presence of credit rationing by identifying the presence of 
credit constrained households using indirect evidence which is executed by testing the 
sensitivity of current consumption to transitory income. Uncertainty can induce 
precautionary behavior and a dependence of consumption on transitory income even 
in the absence of credit constraints.  In addition, empirical testing of both credit 
constraints and precautionary behavior simultaneously leads to identification 
problems. Furthermore, simulation results have shown that with precautionary saving, 
a credit-constrained household can smooth consumption. Hence one can conclude that 
the violation of an implication of the hypothesis is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for being credit-constrained (Diagne et al, 2000). The test for permanent 
income hypothesis also suggests the presence of panel data sets which is a demanding 
requirement in the context of household surveys conducted in less developed 
countries. 
 
The existence of credit constraints has implications for a variety of issues. These 
include tests for the LCPIH of consumption, the effectiveness of fiscal policy, the 
distributional effects of fiscal policy, competition in credit markets, and the supply, 
demand and distribution of credit between applicants (Crook, 2001). Credit constraint 
can arise due to imperfect information and adverse selection effects that are strong 
enough to push some households out of capital markets (Aryeety and Udry, 1997; 
Stiglitz andWeiss, 1981).  The importance of access to credit for policy purposes lies 
in several strands. First, access to credit guarantees the availability of financial 
resources which can be used to buy inputs; finance business start ups and hence 
reduce poverty.  Second, it can also help households to smooth consumption in the 
face of idiosyncratic and/or covariate risks (Udry, 1991; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990). 
Third, in the specific context of Ethiopia, provision of credit for the poor can 
complement existing reform packages to pro-poor growth (Dercon and Krishnan, 
2001).  
 
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the 
various approaches of identifying credit-constrained households. Section 3 gives a 
description of the data and our definition of credit constrained households. Section 4 
gives insight into the structure of credit markets in urban Ethiopia. Section 5 presents 
and discusses econometric evidence.  Finally, we forward concluding remarks and 
highlight some policy implications of our results. 
 
2. Approaches to Identify Credit Constrained Households 
Empirical methodologies of identifying credit constrained households have been 
based on two major approaches.  The first of these approaches, is an indirect one, due 
to Hall (1978) which infers the existence of credit constraints by testing the life 
cycle/permanent income hypothesis. This hypothesis states that, with standard convex 
preferences, in the absence of liquidity and borrowing constraints, transitory income 
shocks should not affect consumption (Diagne et al, 2000; Zeldes, 1989). The second 
approach is a direct one and exploits information about the status of loan applications 
of households (Feder et al, 1989; and Jappelli,1990). Feder et al’s survey of China 
asks households whether at the going interest rate they would have liked to borrow 
more institutional credit than they were granted. Non-borrowing households were 
asked their reason for not borrowing.  If it was not due to sufficient own-liquidity, but 
due to inability to obtain credit, then this group was classified as constrained.
1
  
Jappelli (1990) defines credit constrained consumers as those who had their request 
for credit rejected by financial institutions.  He also identified households who are 
discouraged from taking a loan as constrained.  The discouraged were those who 
answered “yes” to the question: “Was there any time in the past few years that you (or 
your husband/wife) thought of applying for credit at a particular place but changed 
your mind because you thought you might be turned down?” Fairly recently, others 
argue that the direct approach classifies households into discrete groups which does 
not allow one to measure the extent of the credit constraint faced by households 
(Diagne et al, 2000).  This line of research argues for the data collection methodology 
that identifies a credit limit variable – the maximum that the lender is willing to lend. 
This limit is not the maximum the lender is able to lend to any borrower.  The 
                                                           
1
 Feder et al (1989) thus drop the crucial assumption made in previous studies in the literature, of 
homogenous credit demand and supply situations for borrowers and non-borrowers.  The reason is that 
often non-borrowers do not borrow, not because they are not credit-worthy or cannot obtain credit, but 
because they have sufficient liquidity of their own. Furthermore, the liquidity position of unconstrained 
households as compared to constrained households is found to be much higher.  This implies that 
surplus cash incomes for some households do exist.    The reasonable assumption made, therefore, is 
that households should be analysed in terms of whether they are credit-constrained or not. 
borrower is not constrained if the optimal amount desired by her/him is less than the 
amount that can be borrowed. Using this procedure, evidence is found from surveys 
conducted in Malawi and Bangladesh.
2
. 
 
3. Data  
 
The analysis in this study is based on the 4
th
 round socio-economic survey of urban 
households in Ethiopia (EUHS, 2000) which has been collected by the Department of 
Economics of Addis Ababa University in collaboration with the Department of 
Economics of the University of Goteborg, Sweden. The survey questionnaire was 
designed to capture the major socio-economic characteristics of urban households. It 
included modules on household demographics including education, credit, rural-urban 
migration, employment and income, consumption, ownership of durables, housing, 
health, welfare and welfare change indicators.   
 
A sample of 1500 households were selected from seven major urban centers of the 
country. The total sample size was distributed over the selected urban centers 
proportional to their populations, based on the CSA’s (Central Statistical Authority) 
1992 projections. Accordingly, the sample included 900 households in Addis 
Ababa(the capital city), 125 in Dire Dawa, 75 in Awassa, and 100 in each of the other 
four towns. 
 
An extended definition of credit-constrained households 
 
Due to a unique nature of our survey information, we identified three categories of 
credit constrained households. The first category of constrained households are 
defined as those households that report a positive response to the following question: 
“During the last 12 months, did any member of your household apply for a loan and 
was the loan completely rejected?”  In addition, our data consists of information on 
two more other categories of households. The first category of households consists of 
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 There are of course downsides to this approach too, as the authors point out.  The credit limit variable 
will not be totally accurate until all potential borrowers apply.  Heteroskedasticity would also arise  
since individuals who are nearer their credit limit are more able to accurately predict their limit than 
those who are further away from their limits. 
 
households that have applied for a loan and who reported less than 100 percent as the 
loan percentage approved. These households are credit-constrained because they 
applied for a loan but got a loan amount less than the amount they applied for. The 
third category of constrained households are what we classify as ‘discouraged 
borrowers’. Our data asks households to supply their reasons if they failed to apply 
for a loan  in the last 12 months. For instance, households have cited many reasons for 
not applying such as ‘we will not have any chance of success’, ‘loan application takes 
long time to process’, ‘high interest rate’, …etc. In the present application, we 
considered those households that give the above reasons as credit-constrained 
households.  Our extended direct approach enabled us to provide a more complete 
definition of credit constrained households unlike previous studies (Diagne et al, 
2000; Jappelli, 1990). In the next section, we discuss some of the characteristics of 
credit markets in urban areas in Ethiopia.  
 
4. Main Features of the Credit Market in Urban Ethiopia 
 
This section explores the structure of credit markets in urban Ethiopia in detail.  One 
of the main observable features of credit markets in developing countries is the 
presence of segmented and well-defined formal and informal financial institutions 
(Aryeetey and Udry, 1997). The degree to which these sectors are affected by adverse 
selection, moral hazard and enforcement problem determines the nature of the 
transactions between lenders and potential borrowers. The discussion below 
highlights the main features of the urban credit market in Ethiopia as gleaned from 
our data.   
 
Sources of loans   
 
The information on sources of loans reveals the importance of the informal sector. 
According to table 1 below, 79.4% of the 315 households obtained their loan from the 
informal and semi-formal sectors while 14% of loans were obtained from the formal 
sector.  The most predominant source within the informal sector is ‘friends and 
relatives’ (59%).  Not a great proportion of loans originate from group schemes such 
as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (Roscas). This is not surprising because 
Ethiopian Roscas are primarily formed as vehicles of saving mobilization rather than 
credit institutions.  It is also interesting to note that there are few loans obtained from 
moneylenders who are dominant lenders elsewhere such as India.  In the formal 
sector, the microfinance institutions play the dominant role in lending (9.2%) while 
banks and the government provide very few loans. Despite the fact that our 
households are located in major urban centers where it is normally expected that the 
formal sector is relatively active in providing capital to households,  not many of the 
households appear to have obtained their loans from banks
3
.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Is there a link between the source and duration of loans? Almost half of the 
households that reported taking out loans did not report the due date of their loans. 
For those we observe valid responses, most of the loans are short-term loans. For 
instance, 96 percent of the loans have to be repaid within one year. A further 
examination of the data reveals that most of the short-term loans have originated from 
informal lenders while loans with long-term repayment period were extended by the 
formal sector. Therefore, there is a strong link between the source and duration of the 
loan – a link that might extend to the purpose for which the loan amount is used.  
 
Do male-headed households have preferential access to different sources of loans? 
 
We investigated whether households headed by males and females have differential 
access to various sources of loans. According to table 2 below, both types of 
households have equal access to credit; the number of male-headed households that 
accessed loans being slightly less than that of female-headed households. This is 
somewhat surprising in a society where males are often favored over females. While 
friends and relatives give more loans to males, formal institutions such as banks and 
micro-finance institutions give more loans to females.  For instance, the number of 
females who accessed loans from micro-finance institutions is more than twice as 
large as the number of males.  This is an indication of the success achieved by micro-
finance institutions in reaching disadvantaged groups. It is also interesting to note that 
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 Only 16 % of the households reported to having a bank account indicating to the acute lack of 
financial depth even in the major urban centers of the country.  
 
58 percent of the individuals who accessed formal loans are females as opposed to 48 
percent in the case of informal loans.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Uses of loans  
 
Households took loans both for consumption
4
 and productive purposes. The two 
major reasons for taking out a loan related to food purchases (28.5%) and expansion/ 
setting up businesses (27.6%). Other important reasons include payment of utilities 
and related expenses (13.8%), financing health, education and transport expenses 
(13.4%) and purchase of  consumer durables (11.0%). Very few households took out a 
loan to build a house (5.7%).  In an attempt to uncover whether there is any 
systematic relationship between purpose and source of loans, we found that friends 
and relatives provide loans practically for all purposes. This confirms the fact that 
informal agencies ensure a lower probability of default because they have a better 
knowledge of their clients and hence do not suffer from severe adverse selection, 
moral hazard and enforcement problems as formal credit institutions (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). After friends and relatives however, credit associations and 
microfinance institutions are the next largest lenders, and tend to lend for various 
purposes. However, formal sources such as banks do not fund other consumption 
activities but provide loans for business start ups/expansion suggesting a certain 
degree of segmentation. This indicates quite a high degree of exclusiveness of loans 
from the various sectors which results from asymmetric information limiting the 
extent to which formal lenders can monitor borrower activities, hence excluding 
borrowers from formal sector loans (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). 
 
Interest rates 
 
Apart from the interest rates charged, there are no data on any other conditions 
imposed on loans by lenders such as interlinkages of contracts with other markets.  
                                                           
4
 Consumption credit enables risk pooling among risk-averse households across time in an attempt to 
smooth consumption under uncertain income streams and thus plays the role of insurance (Eswaran and 
Kotwal, 1990).  
The minimum rate was 0% while the maximum was 20%, with 33% of loans being 
interest free.  The mean interest rate is only 3.1% and this is not due to the fact that a 
proportion of the population surveyed is significantly Islamic
5
 because Muslims 
constitute only 13.3% of all the households interviewed. The underlying reason for 
low use of interest rates could be explained if we link interest rates with sources of 
loan. As expected, friends and relatives lent without requiring interest payments. In 
addition, employers, credit associations and even NGO/Government too give a small 
number of interest free loans. Therefore, not all formal sector loans are interest 
bearing. Equally not all of the loans obtained from friends and relations are interest 
free. For instance, micro-finance institutions, banks and credit associations tend to 
charge interest across the whole range of rates while there is one case of friends or 
relatives charging the highest rate of 20%.  Most of the rates provided by micro-
finance institutions are small which is consistent with the rates common in group 
lending schemes. The nature of interest rates seems to indicate that credit markets in 
urban Ethiopia are likely to characterized by low interest rates as far as the informal 
lenders go, however the consideration of default risk by these lenders is not altogether 
absent. This is in sharp contrast to the extensive literature on dominance of 
exploitative moneylenders in credit markets of less developed economies. Our finding 
does not also support the rationing hypothesis which is based on the assumption that 
formal credit is the cheapest credit available (Pal, 2002; Bell et al 1997)  
 
Loan amount and Household Characteristics  
 
Households are asked to report the loan amount they borrowed both in cash and in 
kind. The loan component reported in-kind has been converted into cash equivalents 
during the interview. The average annual loan amount of all households is 223 birr
6
 
with a maximum of 50,000 birr.  The majority of households took out a loan less than 
10,000 birr. To investigate some interesting relationships, we linked the loan amount 
borrowed with household characteristics. Table 3 shows summary statistics of total 
loan amount by household characteristics.   There seems to be little gender bias again, 
as females receive only slightly less of the mean total loan amount (213 birr) than 
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 Udry (1991) shows this is a main feature of the workings of informal credit institutions in a Nigerian 
village. 
males (230 birr).  Total loan is found to be increasing in household size, but for very 
large households, this loan amount falls. Large households are often characterized by 
low levels of standard of living and the lower mean loan amount can be an indication 
of the severe quantity rationing that poor households suffer from. For the ethnic 
groups Gurage and especially Tigre, there appears to be a significantly larger mean of 
the total loan granted as compared to the other ethnic groups. Household with 
Protestant heads also received higher mean loan amount than other households. 
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
Constrained households 
 
Credit-constrained households in this study are defined according to the details given 
in section 3 above. Table 4 gives the number of constrained households. 293 
households have applied for a loan and supplied their reasons for borrowing. 17 of 
these households have failed to report the status of their application. Therefore, they 
are excluded from the sample. Out of the original sample of 1500 households, 1179 
did not apply for a loan and reported various factors that deter them from applying. 
The results show the presence of a high percentage of credit-constrained households 
in urban Ethiopia (26.6%).  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
It is evident that the discouraged constitute the highest proportion of the credit-
constrained households. The two major reasons for discouragement are households’ 
perception of the success probability of their loan application and lack of collateral. 
For instance, 47.9% of the discouraged borrowers did not apply because they believed 
they would not be successful while 32.8% of them did not apply because they did not 
have collateral.  The interest rate (13%) and loan processing time or transaction cost 
(5.42%) were also mentioned as deterrents to applying.  
 
5. Econometric Evidence  
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 Note that this average is computed by including households with zero loan amount. The birr is the 
Ethiopian currency; for instance, £1=13.20 birr or  1USD=8.50 birr. 
In this section, we adopt a multivariate analysis to address the two major issues raised 
at the introductory part of the study. To predict the probability of being credit 
constrained (say P), we estimated a probit model and the determinants of loan amount 
has been modeled using a tobit model which controls for potential non-
randomness/selectivity bias in observing borrowing households. We present the 
results from probit and tobit models respectively.  
 
The empirical modeling of the determinants of access to credit or likelihood of being 
credit constrained is handled by estimating a probit model  and this is due to the 
binary nature of the dependent variable. Assume an underlying latent response 
variable *iy  which is defined by the relationship iii xy µβ += '
* . In practice, we do 
not observe *iy  but a dummy dependent variable y which takes a value of either 0 or 
1. In the present context, a value of 1 is assigned to credit-constrained households and 
zero otherwise. X represents a vector of household characteristics and the iµ  is the 
error term which is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. 
 
Our independent variables (x) are grouped into five groups:  (i) proxies for current 
resources such as total household expenditure and the value of household assets, (ii) 
proxies for expected future income such as years of schooling, (iii) a proxy for past 
credit history such as outstanding debt, (iv) demographic variables and (v) regional 
variables. It is important to note that these variables can reflect both determinants of 
demand for credit and determinants of supply of credit.  Hence in some cases the 
effects of the independent variables on the probability of being credit constrained may 
be a priori ambiguous as demand and supply factors may be working in the same 
direction. The probit model estimates are presented in table 5 below. 
 
The coefficients of the proxies for current resources have the expected negative signs 
and are significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient on years of schooling is also 
negative and significant at the 1% level.  Therefore, richer households and those with 
educated heads have a lower probability of being rationed out of the credit market. 
The negative coefficient on education suggests that it is supply side (rather than 
demand) considerations that act to relax the credit constraint These results indicate 
that lenders use both current and future expected income as important criteria for 
judging creditworthiness of a borrower.  
 
In contrast, households with outstanding debt, with dependent children between the 
age of 6 and 15 and that live in the capital city and Bahar Dar are more likely to be 
credit constrained. Among these constraining variables, outstanding debt increases the 
probability by a substantial margin. This suggests that information about previous 
credit history is used by lenders to judge the repayment ability of potential borrowers. 
In addition, the presence of more dependants in a given household may discourage 
lenders from lending because it has direct implication in terms of earning capacity, as 
well as causing higher desired consumption by borrowers thereby tightening the credit 
constraint. Household size, age  and its square term do not feature as significant 
determinants of P. However,  these are household characteristics that other studies 
have found to be highly significant (Zeller, 1994).  Marital status and gender  
dummies were also found to be insignificant, the latter implying no gender bias and 
confirming our findings in the previous section.  Location matters in accessing 
loanable funds in urban Ethiopia. Relative to Mekele, households in Addis Ababa and 
Bahar Dar are more likely to be credit constrained suggesting the presence of regional 
variations in the ways credit markets function in the country.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 
In this study, we also investigated the factors affecting the volume of loan accessed by 
households. To allow for the censored nature of the dependent variable, we have 
estimated a tobit model assuming a correlation between the unobservables affecting 
households decision to borrow with their decision on how much to borrow. Since the 
model of determinants of the volume of loan amount can be perceived as a model of 
credit demand, it is not reasonable to exclude households with zero loan amounts. The 
tobit model handles the potential selectivity bias that arises due to the non-random 
choice of borrowing households.  In addition, the tobit model is chosen over other 
possible two-stage estimations techniques (e.g. Heckman two-stage selection model) 
due to a lack of any theoretical guide as to the choice of appropriate identifying 
restrictions at the second stage of the estimation. The estimated parameters (i.e. 
marginal effects) are reported in table 6 below.  While it can be of use to analyze the 
determinants of loan amount from the borrower’s perspective, thereby reflecting 
behavior on the demand side of the credit market, the variables collected here are 
those determinants likely to be used from the lender’s perspective to screen 
borrowers. Given this, the econometric analysis allows us to see the extent of 
rationing that occurs once the lender has decided to lend.   
 
The explanatory variables in the tobit model represent determinants of rationing 
mostly on the supply side of the market.  The expected signs differ this time, for 
example, total loan amount is likely to be increasing in current income and household 
assets. While demand side influences may be simultaneously at play, their relative 
importance as compared to supply side influences would depend on the relative 
bargaining power of borrowers and lenders.  However, the main influence on the total 
loan amount granted is likely to be the degree to which the lender expects the 
borrower to repay/default. 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
From table 6, it is evident that current resources (total value of assets but not total 
household expenditure), the value of collateral, outstanding debt, age of the head and 
the presence of number of children aged between 6 and 5 are significant positive 
factors in affecting the volume of loan households received. The estimation also 
reveals a significant quadratic relationship between the age of the head and the 
volume of loan.  Households receive  smaller volume of loans if they are headed by a 
married person. Except for the sign on variables such as marital status, the number of 
dependant children and outstanding debt our results are consistent with our a priori 
theoretical expectation about the loan amount supplied by lenders. But due to the 
simultaneity of demand and supply factors, the negative marital status dummy can be 
an indication of  the financial stability of the household and its accompanied declining 
demand for loans. Likewise the positive coefficients on variables such as the number 
of dependant children and outstanding debt reflect the households’ financial stress and 
their increased demand for loans.  The positive coefficient of the collateral variable 
reinforces the theoretical argument that collateral can serve to mitigate some of the 
consequences of asymmetric information (Bardhan and Udry, 1999).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study was motivated by the absence of empirical evidence with regard to the 
credit rationing hypothesis in urban Ethiopia. We showed the main features of credit 
markets in urban Ethiopia, identified credit constrained households and the associated 
factors that affect the probability of credit constrained. In the final part of our analysis 
we also examined the determinants of the loan amount received/demanded by 
households.  Our analysis reveals that credit markets are slightly segmented and 
surprisingly the informal sector is the major source of loans even if we examined an 
urban data set. The most predominant source of loans within the informal sector is 
‘friends & relatives’ as opposed to the traditional money lender. Another interesting 
feature is the absence of gender, ethnic and religious discrimination in loan 
allocations. As often is the case elsewhere, more female-headed households are 
served by micro-finance institutions than males. In our sample, households took loans 
both for consumption smoothing and investment purposes. The greater proportion of 
these loans are either interest free or carry low interest rates and we do not find 
support for the rationing hypothesis because the formal sector is not the cheapest 
source of finance.  
 
 An extended direct approach has identified 26.6% of the sampled households as 
credit constrained and the majority of these households are discouraged borrowers. A 
multivariate analysis showed that the probability of being credit constrained is 
significantly affected by current household resources, schooling of the household 
head, outstanding debt, dependency ratio and location (‘macro credit rationing’ 
factors). In addition, current resources, collateral, outstanding debt and marital status 
of the head were found to be significant determinants of the loan amount households 
managed to access (‘micro credit rationing’ factors). The findings suggest that 
poverty is an issue to be tackled not only in its own right, but also because it spills 
over into the credit market by limiting their participation. Too few years of education 
is another determinant raising the probability of being credit constrained possibly by 
signaling poor repayment potential of households in the long run. This provides 
justification for government focus on education policy to enhance employment 
opportunities and individuals’ future income. Collateral is one of the main deterrents 
of applying for those who are discouraged borrowers.  As it is the case in many 
countries, land is a major collateral used by lenders in Ethiopia. Currently, there is 
limited access to bank loans using land lease deeds as collateral hence limiting access 
to credit. There is also an uneven distribution of land due to hindrances in 
administrative procedures and other sensitive political interventions.  The role for 
government policy here is to ensure a more equal distribution of land and some form 
of intervention in the regional governments’ control over land leases. These 
considerations are important, otherwise inequities in the land market feed into 
inequities in the credit market. 
 
As for general credit policy, there are further implications provided by this study. We 
observed that micro financing institutions from the formal sector and credit 
associations from the semi-formal sector also provide a large proportion of loans and 
for varied uses. By exploiting existing strong social ties policy may do well to focus 
on building such institutions to enhance access to credit. In addition, the formal sector 
can enhance loan delivery as well as loan recovery by tackling inefficiency of staff, 
extensive bureaucracy and corruption. In our data, micro-finance institutions have 
been shown to be reaching vulnerable/relatively poorer groups such as women that are 
rationed out of the formal sector. These institutions can be used to ease the credit 
constraints households face and alleviate the government failure in credit delivery.  
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Table 1:Source of Loans 
Informal and Semi-formal Number of households (%) 
Friends/relatives 
Credit Association 
Money Lender 
Employer 
Other informal  
(e.g. ROSCAs )7 
186 (59.0) 
40 (12.7) 
10 (3.2) 
9 (2.9) 
5 (1.6) 
Formal   
Micro-finance institutions 
Banks 
Government/NGOs 
Other formal 
29 (9.2) 
10 (3.2) 
5 (1.6) 
21 (6.7) 
Total  315 (100) 
Source: Own-calculation from EUHS, 2000 
 
Table 2: Distribution of the number of males and females by source of loan   
Source of loan  Male  Female Total  
Money lender  5 5 10 
Family/relative 85 76 161 
Credit/association 18 18 36 
Employer 3 5 8 
Other informal  2 3 5 
Banks 3 5 8 
Government/NGOs 2 2 4 
Micro-finance institutions  8 18 26 
Other formal  11 8 19 
Total  137 (49.5%) 140 (50.5) 277 
Source: Own-calculation from EUHS, 2000 
                                                           
7
 Roscas in many parts of Ethiopia are known by the name Equb.  
Table 3: Total Loan Amount by Household Characteristics 
Characteristics  Mean  Frequency (%) 
Gender  
Male  230.25   832 
Female  213.54   591 
Household size 
1 to 5 160.85 667 
6 to 10  270.56 683 
Greater than 10 191.87 73 
Ethnic groups  
Amhara 197.37   732 
Oromo 136.97   258 
Gurage 265.62   162 
Tigre  386.72   157 
Religion 
Orthodox  213.04   1147 
Catholic  66.92   13 
Protestant  311.54   52 
Muslim  220.89   180 
Location  
Addis Ababa  99.28   445 
Non- Addis Ababa 32.03   328 
Source: Own-calculation from EUHS, 2000 
 
Table 4:Constrained Households 
Type of households  Number (%) 
Discouraged households 332 (22.8) 
Households with rejected applications  15 (1.0) 
Households that received a loan amount less than the amount they 
applied for 
41 (2.8) 
Households with successful loan applications  220 (15.1) 
Total  1455 (100) 
 
TABLE  5: A probit model predicting the probability of being credit constrained  
Variable  Marginal Effects (t-value) 
Constant  -0.721 (1.97) 
Total expenditure -6.34e-04 (2.30)** 
Value of assets -8.92e-06 (2.55)** 
Years of schooling  -0.009 (2.61)*** 
Outstanding debt 0.540 (10.41)*** 
Age  0.004 (0.85) 
Age 2  -4.3e-04 (0.83) 
Household size -0.032 (1.00) 
Children under 6 0.035 (0.88) 
Children between 6 and 15 0.065 (1.96)** 
Adults between 16 and 54 0.028 (0.85) 
Married  -0.007 (0.17) 
Female  -0.008 (0.19) 
Addis  0.115 (1.99)** 
Awassa  0.027 (0.31) 
Bahar Dar 0.156 (1.97)** 
Dessie  0.122 (1.51) 
Dire  0.234 (3.18)*** 
Jimma  0.0247 (0.32) 
Number of observations  1310 
LR chi 2 (14) 221.90 
Prob> chi 2  0.0000 
Pseudo R Squared 0.13 
N.B.:  Collateral was dropped automatically due to multicollinearity with the other income proxies. 
Variables ‘Adults above 55’ and ‘Mekele’ are omitted demographic and location variables to ensure 
identification.*=Significant at the 10% level;**= Significant at the 5% level; and ***= Significant at 
the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE  6: A Tobit model of loan amount received by households  
Variable  Marginal Effects (t-value) 
Constant  -705.77 (4.98)*** 
Total expenditure -3.263 (0.38) 
Value of assets 13.63 (1.99)** 
Collateral  0.033 (11.41)*** 
Years of schooling  2.366 (0.94) 
Outstanding debt 446.75 (12.05)*** 
Age  10.99 (2.11)** 
Age 2  -0.11 (2.09)** 
Children under 6 7.11 (0.41) 
Children between 6 and 15 34.12 (3.94) *** 
Adults between 16 and 54 1.05 (0.17) 
Married  16.93 (0.55) 
Female  33.94 (1.11) 
Addis  -72.54 (1.72)* 
Awassa  -82.58 (1.39) 
Bahar Dar -94.58 (1.59) 
Dessie  -68.62 (1.17) 
Diredawa  -63.16 (1.14) 
Jimma  -88.08 (1.45) 
Log likelihood function -2714.28 
Number of observations  1310 
N.B.. Variables ‘Adults above 55’ and ‘Mekele’ are omitted demographic and location variables to 
ensure identification.*=Significant at the 10% level;**= Significant at the 5% level; and ***= 
Significant at the 1% level. 
 
